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How do production firms adapt to civil war? The answer to this question will inform the 
potential for economic development during and after conflict. Many businesses survive 
violent conflict, and in some cases even thrive. Understanding these successes will help 
policymakers to support the “coping economy” during civil wars, and to understand 
better the post-conflict economy as a system. In this paper I use the case of production 
firms operating in Liberia’s capital, Monrovia, during the country’s civil war to argue 
that successful wartime firms continually adapt their supply chain structures in response 
to a shifting combat frontier by dispersing their functions spatially and temporally. Such 
adaptability depends on the rapid gathering (via business networks) and processing (at 
the place of production) of information. This contention represents a micro-level 
explanation for, and also a conditioning of, the generally accepted view that industries 
that survive civil war tend to be non-capital intensive and non-trade intensive. 
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1 Introduction 
From its inception, development economics has revered the industrialization process. 
Economists from Smith to Rostow and from Gershenkron to Lewis have emphasized the 
importance of industrial factories as crucibles in which the division of labor is refined, a 
labor force is developed, and technical knowledge is generated and shared. And though 
the poorest countries with weak industrial sectors are also the ones that tend to fall prey 
to the so-called “conflict trap”, little research on economies in conflict has explored how 
production firms operate. 
Much recent research has focused on those types of “contested sectors” like the 
extractive industries that can drive and prolong violent conflict. A few examples include 
Fearon (2005), Humphreys (2005), Karl (1997), Klare (2002), Le Billon (2001), Ross 
(2004), and Snyder (2004). Furthermore, research on the private sector in conflict has 
emphasized the vulnerability of capital concentrations and the trade routes that link 
them. Collier (1999), for instance, asserts that capital- and trade-intensive sectors 
(notably including industrial production and manufacturing) are “war vulnerable,” while 
sectors like agriculture are not. And a growing body of conflict research seems ready to 
strike from the agenda study of firm level economic actors typically characterized by 
concentrated capital, labor, and trade requirements. Rather, it seeks to understand the 
role of “entrepreneurs” in conflict—a term used alternately for those who innovate in 
the private sector and those who simply start small, replicative businesses. Regardless of 
the definition adopted, this “entrepreneurship and conflict” literature connotes economic 
activity carried out by atomistic individuals, and not by larger coordinated firms. 
Many production firms survive and even thrive in the face of violent conflict. The fact 
that the survivors are, for the most part, producers of inelastic or inferior goods that are 
expensive to import is not surprising. But the fact that they continue to operate at all 
may be surprising, given their high capital and labor intensiveness. Using the case of 
Monrovia, Liberia, during that country’s protracted civil war, I contend that production 
firms that survive or thrive in violent conflict do so by performing a delicate balancing 
act between concentrating capital and labor to produce efficiently in the pockets of 
relative calm, and dispersing them spatially and temporally when the combat frontier 
approaches one of the production chain components. Such adaptability relies upon 
rapidly gathering information (via production networks) and processing it (at the place 
of production). 
1.1  The Importance of Production Firms 
There are good theoretical reasons to seek to understand the adaptations of production 
firms in the world’s poorest and most conflict affected countries. Caruso’s (2008) model 
of a two-sector economy at war suggests that investment in an “uncontested sector” 
(i.e., one whose value added is not wholly up for grabs in the struggle) can increase total 
welfare. Industrial manufacturing is a good candidate for a real-world uncontested 
sector because its value adding mechanisms are sophisticated and primarily knowledge-
based (as opposed to the resource extraction industries, for instance, whose value is 
largely not added, but found). This distinction means that a production firm’s entire 
coordinated production network must be functional in order to generate profit for 
would-be “taxers”. Manufacturing shares the trait of sophisticated, knowledge-intensive 
value adding processes with the service sector. However, the manufacturing sector has   2
the potential to buy from, as well as sell to rural populations. By sourcing its raw 
materials locally from rural areas, it can link industrial capital concentrations with 
hinterlands in mutually beneficial ways1. By contrast, the service sector in less 
developed countries typically only sells to, not buys from, rural areas.  
The special place occupied by the manufacturing sector—neither easily appropriated, 
nor necessarily beneficial to a narrow urban elite—may in turn place serious limitations 
on the levels of destructiveness of any profit-maximizing rebel group wishing to capture 
it. There are at least a couple of possible causal mechanisms that might account for this: 
the first top down, and the second bottom up. First, in a top-down scenario, the potential 
for taxation (or extortion) by a rebel group may incent rebel leaders to preserve the 
value adding processes intact, which becomes in effect the goose that lays the golden 
eggs. Second, in a bottom-up scenario, the often rural support base of the rebel group2 
may erode with diminishing industrial demand for their produce. This reasoning implies 
the hypothesis that the more an economy’s product is generated through industrial 
manufacturing, the less destructive conflict should be. Given the fact that the recent 
occurrence of a civil war raises the risk of a country descending into widespread 
violence within a decade from just 9 to 40 percent (Collier 2007), the adaptations of the 
private sector during one conflict may bear on the risk and extent of violence the next 
time around. 
A preliminary ordered logistic regression analysis using cross-country panel data for 
185 countries from the years 1960 to 2006 finds that, controlling for sectoral 
composition, year, standard macro-economic indicators, and trade flows, every 
percentage point rise in the value of manufactured goods as a fraction of total 
merchandise exports is associated with a significant 1.3 percent decrease in conflict-
related deaths. Similarly, a twofold increase in the absolute value of manufactured 
goods produced is significantly associated with a decline in conflict-related deaths of 
roughly 35 percent. Contrariwise, a twofold increase in absolute value of agricultural 
goods and general services is significantly associated with an increase  in conflict-
related deaths of about 44 and 373 percent respectively.3 
1.2 Literature  Review 
This paper contributes to an emerging body of work on economies in conflict (Pugh and 
Cooper 2004; Berdal and Malone 2000). There are few precedents to draw in terms of 
studies of firms in war specifically. Given the lacuna in the conflict literature on 
organizations in war, it is helpful to begin filling the gap with existing organizational 
theory literature, which emphasizes the causal link between environment and 
organizational structure. Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) posit that vertical organizations 
are better suited to predictable environmental influences, while horizontal ones are 
better suited to the unpredictable. Such a theory implies that a wartime business would 
tend to “flatten” or outsource its hierarchy. March (1991) creates a model in which an 
organization’s adaptability to “turbulence” is a function of the likelihood of turbulence 
                                                 
1   See, for instance, Evans 1992. 
2  On the increasing tendency of civil wars to pit rural hinterlands against urban centers, see Grünewald 
and Levron (2004). 
3  These estimates are provided from an unpublished analysis the author is currently performing.   3
and the rate of acquisition of new information on the environment,4 suggesting that 
wartime businesses would be willing to pay premiums for information on emerging 
risks. In an argument that also touches on organizational learning, economist Alice 
Amsden (2001) asserts that a key component to late industrializing corporate success is 
transforming foreign technology into organizational know how. This raises the question 
of whether difficulties in sourcing more foreign technology may result in attempts to 
substitute investments in human capital aimed at improving in-house repair and 
maintenance services—and a possible ironic effect that damage to physical capital may 
catalyze this organizational learning. 
On the subject Supply Chain Management (SCM), the theory of “dispersal economies” 
(Li and Polenske 2004) states that distant target markets justify more decentralized 
distribution networks, and that businesses choose to minimize SCM costs in balancing 
transportation costs against inventory costs. Therefore, as transportation costs rise, 
businesses shift their emphasis to geographically dispersed inventory locations. In war, 
large shipments may be differentially targeted at military checkpoints (especially at the 
combat frontier), and so militate against large concentrations of stock en route or in situ. 
In effect, we may infer that as an approaching combat frontier in essence renders 
distribution and sourcing points behind it progressively farther away, distribution and 
sourcing networks will decentralize. 
1.3  Research Design for the Empirical Study 
1.3.1  Case Selection 
This study chose Liberia as a case study for a number of reasons. First, the Liberian 
Civil War lasted for 14 years—long enough for businesses to consider the war 
environment as a status quo, rather than a brief, exceptional period. This consideration 
is particularly important given the increasing frequency in modern times of low burning, 
long lasting civil wars (Karl 1997; Klare 2002). 
Second, the war was intense enough to do major damage to the economy as a whole and 
consequently present serious, sustained challenges to the survival of local firms. Faced 
with continuing instability over 14 years, FDI into Liberia largely dried up during the 
war. Inflation rose dramatically, and was estimated at 15 percent in 2003. Through war, 
falling commodities prices and mismanagement, the Liberian per capita GDP in US$ 
plummeted from US$1,269 in 1980 to US$163 in 2005 (a decline of over 87 percent), 
as core foreign exchange earning sectors such as rubber and iron ore came to a virtual 
standstill (IMF 2006). Of the 175 countries where the Human Development Index was 
calculated in 1999, Liberia ranked 174; only Sierra Leone was lower (UNDP 2000)—a 
country which had experienced a similar and related set of conflicts but had simply 
started off poorer than Liberia. As the war dragged to a close in late 2003, violence 
surged and civilian exposure to the conflict intensified. At that time, 76 percent of the 
population lived on less than US$1 per day, and 52 percent lived on less than 50 cents 
(GoL 2004). 
Third, peace has been definitively reestablished and the democratic process successfully 
relaunched, allowing for clear identification of instances where wartime adaptations are 
                                                 
4  Though March specifically models the rate of turnover, it can be argued that his model more plausibly 
tests the rate of information gathering.   4
retained for non-conflict related reasons. With the arrival of UNMIL in October 2003, 
all violence came abruptly to an end, and the UN continues to spend US$750 annually 
to support the mission (Sachs 2008). Fourth, the termination of hostilities was recent 
enough that many of the current firm managers were employed by the same firms 
during a substantial part of the war. This is particularly true of the so-called Second 
Liberian Civil War, between Charles Taylor’s government and rebel groups LURD and 
MODEL from 1999 to 2003. 
Finally, Monrovia during the war was a paradigmatic example of a capital city besieged. 
It is home to a preponderant proportion of the country’s industry (and one-third of its 
population), which experienced the approach of a combat frontier in 1990–2 (led by 
Charles Taylor’s NPFL and Prince Johnson’s splinter faction INPFL), and thrice again 
in 2001–3 with the advance on the city of LURD from the north and MODEL from the 
southeast. 
1.3.2  Methods 
I employed semi-structured interviews to obtain information on business operations 
before, during, and after the wars. I chose this qualitative method because (i) many 
business records detailing employment levels, etc. were destroyed during the war, and 
those that were not were difficult to gain access to, (ii) no official statistics were 
gathered on wartime business operations, and (iii) even if they had been, the situation 
changed so rapidly that such snapshots would not be able to convey the dynamic 
process of adaption through any sort of “comparative statics” analysis. 
1.3.3  Firm Selection 
I studied 11 Liberian production firms, gathering anywhere from one to three manager 
interviews at each. Because of the inherent difficulty in finding employees from firms 
that had not survived the war, firms were necessarily limited (with the exception of 
Parker Paints) to those that has survived. Therefore, the dependent variable was not 
taken to be “survival”, but rather supply chain structure. The independent variable was 
the geographic location of the combat frontier in relation to the firm, its suppliers, and 
its markets. 
Potential firms were identified by (i) preliminary examination of a detailed map of 
Monrovia landmarks compiled by the Humanitarian Information Centre of Liberia, (ii) a 
street-by-street driving tour of major business concentrations, and (iii) snowball 
information-gathering during the interview process. Selected firms had to (a) be 
accessible (at least one manager had to be willing to talk about wartime operations), (b) 
focus on domestic serving production, and (c) have been founded before the 
commencement of (and probably continued operating during) the Second War (1999–
2003). Firms were also chosen so as to maximize variation in ownership (local versus 
foreign) and location. Firm selection was stratified by location, where three sections of 
Greater Monrovia were identified: 
1.  Continuously-held central Monrovia: while fighting did come to certain parts of 
central peninsular Monrovia in the First War (1989–1992) and again briefly in 
April 1996, and although the downtown was shelled during the Second War 
(1999–2003), central Monrovia never fell to non-government forces (though the   5
government/non-government distinction is blurred at some points during the 
war). 
2.  Northern Monrovia: this area, which includes the large industrial concentration 
on Bushrod Island and the Freeport of Monrovia (also on Bushrod Island), is 
situated across the mouth of the Mesurado River from central Monrovia. 
Because of its proximity to the city, it has repeatedly been targeted as the main 
route to the capital by rebel armies, and so all of the long standing businesses 
there have had to contend with operating under rebel control. 
3.  Eastern Monrovia: this area consists of the ex-urban townships scattered around 
the eastern portion of the lagoon, from Red Light in the southeast to 
Gardnersville in the northeast. These areas did not come under direct rebel 
control during the Second War, but government control was eroded here and the 
GoL was unable to prevent widespread looting and breakdown of civil order. 
Such variation was meant to distinguish the strategies employed by three classes of 
firms: those continuously under government control, those sporadically under rebel 
control, and those sporadically in an administrative no man’s land. 
2  Supply Chain Management in a Predatory Environment 
SCM is typically conceived as the process of integrating three components of the supply 
chain, or production network: supply, production, and distribution. It is intuitively 
obvious that in the long run, the amount of finished goods a firm distributes cannot 
exceed the amount it produces, nor can the amount produced exceed the amount 
sourced. Expressed symbolically: 
S ≥ P ≥ D     (1) 
where S is the amount of material successfully supplied to the production process, P is 
the amount of material successfully processed during production, and D is the amount 
successfully distributed as final goods. Furthermore, it is intuitively clear that the long 
run Pareto optimal solution for a profit-maximizing firm will be to set all components at 
par with one another: 
S = P = D     (2) 
In this way, the firm is neither sourcing more than it can process, nor processing more 
than it can distribute. This is an important, if obvious, point, when revenue is only 
generated upon distribution. 
If we now assume for the sake of simplicity that the amounts of materials successfully 
supplied, processed and distributed are linear functions of combined material and labor 
inputs (s, p, d respectively, which firms choose) and production coefficients (σ, π, δ 
respectively, which firms are assumed for the moment to take), then we may define the 
Pareto optimal equation in (2) as: 
 
where     6
and       (3) 
Unconstrained, this equation simply tells us that in Pareto optimality, (s, p, d ) vary with 
the inverse of (σ, π, δ). 
If we now consider the productivity coefficient to be the multiplicative product of a 
technological parameter measuring productivity and a measure of freedom from the risk 
of predation (Ai and ρi, where 0 ≤ ρi, ≤ 1),5 we get the following equation: 
 
where       (4) 
If we now allow that firms recognize that dispersed economic activity decreases 
predation, we can see that firms do not take (σ, π, δ ) unequivocally, but rather can 
disperse their activities spatially and temporally to raise the production coefficients.6 
Alternatively, the firm can choose to shift its expenditure on capital and/or labor. To see 
this, we can reasonably posit that the chance that an input will escape predation may be 
expressed as an increasing function of the measure of dispersal of economic activity 
((G, H, I) for activities (S, P, D) respectively) and a decreasing function of the efforts to 
predate or to “tax” goods by rebels, government, or civilians (ri): 
 for  , where   and 
     (5) 
Given the form of (5) the value of ρi is bounded between zero and unity. Since we have 
established that (G, H, I)  are associated with opportunity costs and diseconomies of 
scale, they can in essence be treated factors of production. Treating ri as a constant and 
abbreviating the production functions as f  (s, G),  f  (p, H), and f ( d, I), we might 
construct cost equations to be minimized: 
    (6a) 
   (6b) 
 (6c) 
In these cost equations, (φ, χ, ψ) represent the marginal costs of the supply chain inputs 
(e.g., wages and rents in the case of labor and capital), whereas (γ, η, ι) represent the 
marginal costs of economic activity dispersal in each component. Given the constraints, 
we can write the Lagrangian function for the supply component as follows: 
                                                 
5  The described function for each supply chain component now begins to resemble a Cobb-Douglass 
production function of the form  , except for the addition of   to model the risk of 
predated inputs, the combination of the labor and capital terms in one, and the exclusion of the input 
elasticities as exponents. 
6  Firms also recognize that choosing high value inputs in any process heightens the risk of predation, 
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          ( 7 )  
which will have the first order conditions 
     (8a) 
     (8b) 
     (8c) 
     (8d) 
, and      (8e) 
     (8f) 
8c–8f simply represent the production constraints. 8a and 8b can be rearranged to show 
that the minimum cost will occur when the marginal cost of output due to increasing 
inputs and dispersal are at parity: 
     (9a) 
The same operation can be performed for the other two supply chain components to 
yield: 
 , and      (9b) 
     (9c) 
These in turn can be rearranged to imply that the summed marginal costs of output for 
inputs in all supply chain components is equal to zero at optimality: 
     (10) 
It may also be helpful to recall Equations 8a and 8b in their expanded forms: 
 (11a) 
and 
.     (11b)   8
In other words, greater investment in sourcing production factors (capital and labor) 
may be precipitated by (i) increasing marginal input costs, (ii) rising technological 
sourcing productivity, (iii) greater investment in dispersal, (iv) falling efforts to predate 
goods, (v) greater importance of the disjuncture between supply, and production, and 
supply and distribution, and (vi) falling importance of the budget constraint. Likewise, 
greater investment in dispersal may be associated with (a) greater marginal dispersal 
costs, (b) falling investment (or inability to invest further) in inputs, (c) falling 
technological productivity, (d) rising efforts to predate goods, (e) greater importance of 
the disjuncture between supply and production, and (f) falling importance of the 
disjuncture between supply and distribution and of the budget constraint. Notice, then, 
that rising predation in the supply chain is inversely related to investment in the supply 
process (e.g., hiring truck drivers). Therefore, the rate at which predation decreases such 
investment diminishes as predation rises. That is, the response is sharpest at the onset of 
predation, less as it worsens. The effect of predation on dispersal investment is more 
equivocal. Dispersal investment (e.g., paying more petty traders) will tend to grow with 
more predation (again diminishing at higher levels of predation) if it is more important 
to maintain the sync between supply and distribution than it is between supply and 
production. However, dispersal investment will tend to shrink with predation if it is 
more important to maintain the sync between supply and production than between 
supply and distribution. The former would tend to be the case when the inputs are 
relatively valuable, the latter when the inputs are relatively low value. 
3  Dispersal Strategies in Production Networks 
The forgoing intuitions are borne out by reports from firm managers working in 
Monrovia during the civil war. First, from the constrained maximization model, we 
guess that the degree of dispersal will be influenced by the levels of predation. Second, 
dispersal of economic activity in production network components can take different 
forms depending on which production network component was affected: specifically, 
supply and distribution channels tended to disperse spatially and temporally, while 
production centers, because of their fixed capital requirements, could generally only 
employ temporal dispersal. Finally, consistent with March’s (1991) theory of 
information throughput in turbulent times, production networks were employed as 
information-gathering antennae, informing the shape, and extent of network dispersal. 
3.1  Determinants of Predation Levels 
The degree of predation in any component of the production process depend on three 
primary factors: 
1.  Proximity to the combat frontier 
2.  Rebel (and citizen) conduct 
3.  Value of the targeted good 
3.1.1  Proximity to the combat frontier 
Proximity to the combat frontier was sometimes difficult for firms to gauge, both 
because the combat frontier was blurry at best, and because it moved very rapidly and 
often in unexpected ways. The General Manager of RITCO, a firm located on Bushrod   9
Island that fell repeatedly under LURD control during the Second War, described the 
inability to make contingency plans under such uncertain circumstances: 
You see that war actually becomes something like, um, overnight, they 
on you [sic], so there is nothing you could do. The only thing you could 
do is you have to find a means of way [sic] to hide yourself in order to 
protect your life. Everybody say [sic] to hell with business, only the life 
[matters]. When you can’t make anything, you start from there. You 
don’t think about distributing or what, or production value left in the 
plant. You don’t think about that. 
3.1.2  Rebel/Civilian Behavior 
The predatory tendencies of rebel soldiers varied dramatically from the First War to the 
Second, with clear consequences for the private sector. Lidow (2008) argues that the 
degree of predation among soldiers is a function of top down versus bottom up 
financing mechanisms for militia units, as well as the amount of socialization that goes 
into their recruiting and training. That is, when militia commanders have control of the 
purse strings, they can influence more directly the type of behavior their subordinates 
exhibit. This explanation seems to resonate with business managers, who consistently 
point out that NPFL and INPFL rebel commanders during the First War had much more 
influence over their men than LURD and MODEL commanders in the Second War. 
Furthermore, predation was associated not just with soldiers of the various warring 
factions, but also with the civilian population, which participated in looting in areas and 
times when rule of law was weak. For instance, despite the fact that the Parker Paints 
production facility was located in Paynesville, an area hit by the NPFL during the First 
War, owner Philip Parker remarked about the damage looters did to his factory at that 
time, “to be honest, we lost most of our capital because of civilians”. A manager at 
USTC explained that “[A]nybody could loot. Any civilian who was brave enough could 
loot. Any soldier who had a little gun could go looting, if the property was not 
protected”. Well-disciplined rebel soldiers might sometimes even restrain the excesses 
of civilian looters. Speaking of Prince Johnson, the rebel INFPL commander who took 
over Bushrod Island and the MB facility located there during the First War, one MB 
manager remarked: 
He was really strong, he was a strong commander, so he had them under 
control. Disciplined them when they went wrong, so they were afraid of 
him. They were afraid to harass us civilians and all of that. So the island 
was better compared to central Monrovia and the other side. 
3.1.3  Value of the Targeted Good 
Valuable goods were obviously more coveted than less valuable, but value depended 
ultimately on the prices the products would fetch on the local market. Therefore, 
finished products tended to be targeted by predators more than intermediary ones, which 
in turn were more targeted than raw materials. In fact, raw materials were mostly left 
untouched by looters (though of course some extremely valuable raw materials, such as 
gold, diamonds, and timber continued to be targeted for their value on the international 
market). Philip Parker of Parker Paints related that his raw materials were actually 
jeopardized by the value of their own containers:   10
… When I got back (amazing!), we had lost close to half a million [US] 
dollars worth of raw materials, you know why? Truly, truly amazing. For 
the containers! When I got back, the factory was 8 inches floating in 
pigments, alkaline residues, whatever. Truly amazing. We lost close to 
half a million dollars. But for the containers, if you believe it. They 
wanted the empty drums, the plastic drums, so they just emptied US$250 
worth of raw materials on the ground so they could sell the drum for 
US$2. 
Similarly, the General Manager of CEMENCO remarked: 
What … helped is that there was the raw material that nobody could do 
anything with. Okay, but the other things, generators, the vehicles, office 
equipment, and what have you, nothing can plan to protect. 
3.2  A Typology of Dispersal Strategies and their Competitors 
Liberian firm managers described four basic strategies for dealing with increased 
predation: (i) dispersal (and/or outsourcing), (ii) increased throughput, (iii) 
investment in strengthened property rights, and (iv) accommodation. Which 
strategy was chosen depended upon the tendency of predatory groups, whether 
military or civilian, to loot, and the firm’s willingness to expend financial versus 
social capital (see Error! Reference source not found.). Importantly, dispersal 
strategies were preferentially employed when firms did not have strong financial 
resources on which to draw but faced situations where groups had a strong 
tendency to loot—a situation unfortunately common in Third World civil wars. 
The war environment dispersed economic activity in three primary ways: through 
investment, spatially, and temporally. 
3.2.1  Increased Materials Throughput 
This strategy corresponds to increasing (s, p, d ) in Equation (4) above. It simply implies 
investing more resources in the supply, production, or distribution process in the hopes 
of meeting previous output standards. This strategy was most often employed in 
extraordinary cases or crises where the predation was erratic, rare, or unpredictable, 
making more systematic risk-offsetting strategies too costly to implement on a 
permanent basis. It most often took the forms of (i) more input goods purchased, (ii) 
greater investment in fixed capital, or (iii) more hired staff. 
Examples of the first form include NICOM’s and MB’s repurchase of looted inputs 
(described below in Section 3.2.4). Another example is the common practice of 
overstocking production inputs to be able to produce in the event of disrupted supply 
chains. Overstocking came with its own risks, however, as LISWINCO found out when 
a stray rocket struck its wood stockpile and the lot went up in smoke. Moreover, 
investment in fixed capital was most often associated with accommodating oversized 
supply stockpiles. CEMENCO, for instance, invested in an expanded clinker warehouse. 
   11
Table 1. Survival strategies of production firms in war, including dispersal 
    Rebel/civilian tendency towards looting 
  Low  High 
Resources 
required of the firm 
predated 






Accommodation  Spatial and temporal 
dispersal 
Source: the author. 
Increased investment in human resources was often required when damaged equipment 
forced businesses to adopt more low tech, manpower-intensive contingencies. An 
example of this was found at NICOM and RITCO, both of which engineered back up 
manual production equipment, such as capping machines. RITCO’s manager explained: 
When the machines are broken down, what do we do? We go to manual! 
When the machine it is pumping and it broke down, what do I do? I have 
to go to manual by using a cup. If it is sealing and it cannot seal then I 
have to look for the hand machine, hand sealing. So all the time I get the 
manuals and everything waiting, because not every day is better day. 
You prepare you [rself] in times of war. 
Consequently, both firms acquired the in-house capacity to fix most technical problems 
associated with manual machines and generators. They integrated machinists and 
technical personnel into their usual production staff. Whilst the larger, foreign-owned 
firms such as USTC, CEMENCO, and MB already had large repair shops, they grew 
larger still. 
Finally, increased investment in human resources was required simply by high turnover 
rates among employees. The latter were caused either by deaths among staff or, more 
commonly, by their physical displacement. The manager of RITCO explained why he 
was forced to spend so much time and money on retraining: 
We … suffered casualties of about six or five employees … They went 
to central [Monrovia] for food and they were caught up … in the firing. 
We compensate[d] their family … nothing we can do … [We hired 
replacements [r]ight away. You know, industry is like a machine. When 
a part [is] broken, you have to buy it and put it back before you can 
continue. 
Likewise, the finance manager at USTC recounted his frustrations with high turnover: 
[Turnover]’s still high. During the war a lot of our staff had to leave, a 
lot of them to the United States on various resettlement programs, 
immigrant programs are still running … We did lose a lot of key staff. 
And we continue to experience the differences since 2003. You find 
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yourself having to retrain people over and over again … It gets 
frustrating working in this environment. 
3.2.2  Property Rights Investments 
This strategy was simply to reinforce one’s own property rights through sheer force or 
cunning.8 An example of the first is USTC, which hired a large security force to guard 
its compound. The manager of the Aluminium Factory showed cunning when he 
safeguarded production machinery by disabling the factory’s forklifts, which would 
have been required to load the large machines onto trucks. The manager of Parker 
Paints resorted to camouflage: 
You know, one of the things we did, we made the factory look as if 
nothing was there. You know if you walk there, we put as much junk as 
possible, so that nobody would assume that there was anything there … 
Equipment wise I lost two compressors and a couple of motors. But I 
have all my mills, all my cans, equipment, my welders … we mothballed 
everything, too, so … we make sure that they aren’t hit by rain. Every 
now and again we fire them up. So I mean we’re not too far gone to get 
started again. It won’t take that much. 
3.2.3  Accommodation with Predatory Groups 
It was common for businesses with large compounds to invite government or rebel 
contingents to encamp there, using their buildings as barracks. This tactic reduced the 
risk of predation from other groups and citizens. The manager of Parker Paints 
explained that: 
You had to be flexible. When ECOMOG was here, you still had rampant 
crime. We would allow some ECOMOG soldiers who were stationed in 
the area to use it [the paint factory compound] as a subbase, so they were 
there for a while. You know you just had to be creative. 
MB hosted Prince Johnson’s troops to good effect during the First War, as a manager 
there describes: 
[We] never had a serious problem with them … There was 
minor problems with the employees, or maybe sometimes they 
coming in to get free beer or all of that, but other than that … 
he [Prince Johnson] had them under control, you know. 
However, the protection earned might be withdrawn if and when the guest contingent 
was forced to evacuate, as LURD forces did from the CEMENCO compound. As the 
CEMENCO manager explained: 
Yeah, they lived in the yard, so for the time they were there, 
they were taking care, but when they were about to pull out, 
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they took away everything they could put their hands on: 
doors, windows, you just name it, everything. 
It is interesting to note that the accommodation strategy was resorted to most often 
when the combat frontier had passed over the production center, bringing it under rebel 
control. As Olsen (2000) has noted, once the bandits become “stationary” (as opposed 
to roving to pick off supply and distribution shipments), they tend also to become less 
predatory—thus providing a possible causal connection between the location of the 
combat frontier in relation to the production network, and the tendency of a group to 
loot. 
3.2.4  Spatial and Temporal Dispersal 
Investment Dispersal: FDI tended to flee the country in the war years, of course, but 
much domestic investment, especially that of local entrepreneurs, sensibly minimized 
risk exposure through portfolio diversification—a move which may have deprived 
certain industries of “critical mass” in capital formation. Philip Parker described 
branching out into other industries in the years leading up to and during the war: 
So I diversified, out of the paint, into other things which I thought, not a 
big investment, you still make money, and exposure isn’t that great 
basically. I do [engine retooling and] other things. I’m into mining 
also—small scale gold and diamond mining. So basically you diversified 
into businesses where, one, you didn’t have too much government 
interference, and [two,] you didn’t have too much exposure. 
Temporal Dispersal: Dispersal at the firm level can be classified as either temporal or 
spatial. To generalize, firms in Liberia spatially and temporally dispersed their supply 
and distribution networks, and only temporally dispersed their production (because 
production machinery was largely stationary). 
Temporal dispersal diseconomies in the workplace stemmed primarily from the stop-
and-go nature of all economic activity during the war. During the First War, for 
instance, USTC’s production was characterized by “very limited operations: off and 
on”. However, temporal dispersal in production not only served to keep production staff 
safe in times of intensified fighting, but also protected the value added during the 
production process. By timing the production process exactly so that the finished 
products could immediately be offloaded to distributors, firms could avoid being 
targeted for what they produced. Thus the production process itself served as the 
fulcrum of the entire supply chain, regulating when and how much value was embodied 
in products. The fittest companies in that climate were those that could take “worthless” 
raw materials and rapidly produce finished products whenever distributors became 
available to take the processed goods off of their hands. One of NICOM’s managers 
noted that: 
As we produce, the buyers come …, so we don’t keep too much of stock. 
And it so happened within that time [during the war] we did not have too 
much finished stock, although we had some stock in process that we got 
caught up with [one time], but the actual finished stock wasn’t much. 
Companies were thus forced to forego semi-processed materials (often produced in 
foreign owned factories in the formal sector) for less predated raw materials (sourced by 
local business people in the informal sector). The owner of LISWINCO explained:   14
Until that time [1990, when the NPFL/INPFL closed in on Monrovia], 
we used to get our wood directly from the [foreign owned] saw mills. 
After 1990, people [informal, petty loggers] start using power saws, 
going to the bush to get the wood, so we would take wood from them. 
Spatial Dispersal: Supply and distribution routes that crossed the combat frontier were 
particularly vulnerable to predation (depending on the value of the good). They 
therefore tended to splinter into reticulated webs of small routes where poaching and 
“taxation” could be minimized through networks of trust. This family of strategies 
corresponds to increasing the value of (G, H, I) in the model presented in Section 2. 
Dispersed supply and distribution networks required an army of traders with intimate 
knowledge of geography and the local inhabitants. One manager remarked that “[a] lot 
of small scale trading [took place]. People who had never been involved in business 
before became traders”. They thus required more investments in human resources to 
create redundant networks and coordinate their deliveries. For instance, when NICOM 
began to source more product inputs locally, its purchasing manager increased the 
purchasing department’s staff from 12 to 16, in order to accommodate the larger number 
of small shipments it contracted. 
Supply/distribution dispersal often implied outsourcing as well. The 
small traders that entered the transportation market were generally not 
directly employed by firms, but rather informal. Firms typically 
outsourced jobs that were risky, required little skill, and required 
knowledge of the local social geography. The prototypical examples 
were distribution and sourcing operations in rural areas. An MB manager 
explained: “Nobody could venture out there. No business would do that. 
It was very risky. So we had the people come in to buy”.  
RITCO’s manager expanded: 
[A]s a businessman, I will not take a convoy to go across [the combat 
frontier to distribute]. Immediately it does and they’re caught, full of 
mead. First thing [the rebels will assume] is [that] I have a different 
intention, have come to spy their arsenals, or worse … to leak 
information. So I will be either executed, or you know anything they are 
wanting to do they will do because I have no business to be there. So this 
is what we do: we sell to the petty vendors within our zone and they 
rather convey that across, because they know their way out, small, small 
routes that go to come back. 
CEMENCO’s general manager described the distribution adjustments they made: 
At that time [before the war], we had trucks that conveyed the cement to 
our distributors in the leeward counties … But those trucks and other 
equipment was [sic] taken during the 1990 war. Everything was looted. 
So … we continued to distribute to people in those counties who were 
qualified, they applied and were selected, and then they were given a 
distributorship. And they were responsible to transport their own cement 
to those counties in which they established a distributorship. 
Supply routes, however, varied in their dispersal potential: inputs with local substitutes 
lent themselves to radical supply chain dispersal, while those without required that   15
alternative routes to specialized goods be found, often by crossing international borders 
to access other ports. Alcoholic spirit flavors, for instance, included some of both types: 
while RITCO took to sourcing flavors through Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, NICOM, 
diversified its product line to deemphasize drinks mixed with imported flavors, 
introducing the now-popular “Bitter Cola” cooler. NICOM’s production manager 
explained the rational: “it’s produced from cola nuts that can be gotten locally”. 
Market hyperactivity represents one manifestation of spatial and temporal dispersal of 
supply and distribution chains. The accepted wisdom asserts that war stifles market 
activity, as sellers and buyers will not be able or willing to get to and from markets with 
their wares in tow (Humphreys 2003). In the Liberian case, however, market activity 
was only stifled for brief periods of extreme tension. As fighting subsided, though, 
markets became if anything hyperactive, where hyperactivity is defined as the 
processing of many more transactions than actual products produced. At least two 
factors produced this market hyperactivity: “the recycling effect” and the “hot potato 
effect”. 
Recycling occurs when a good is looted and the victim must then repurchase the same 
or a similar product on the market. CEMENCO’s General Manager explained that 
during the Second War: “… the only thing was that the trucks that were looted from the 
place, we had to compensate them [the rebels] to get the trucks from them”. In other 
words, they had to buy their own trucks back from the looters. This pattern was 
replicated in the cases of many businesses, especially when the product was crucial to 
the production process and when the only prospective buyer was the original owner. 
The production manager of NICOM, a spirits manufacturer, related that: 
… At a certain point in time [during the Second War] the Freeport was 
also looted, and we found some of our flavors, some of our alcohol [on 
the market], and we had to rebuy them [from the looters]… Nobody can 
buy your own thing, so we had to buy our own thing from them, and pay 
for it twice. 
A manager at the national brewery, MB, related a similar anecdote about repurchasing 
looted equipment from the looters: 
When we got back in there [the brewery], it was devastating. They were 
there for like two weeks, but when we got in there, almost everything 
was gone. And when some of the machines they couldn’t take away, they 
would remove the motors from them, so we had to go back on the market 
try to look for them, and they were reselling them. And nobody could 
buy them because we had the machines and nobody else had the 
machines! So nobody could buy the parts, so they resold to us! 
The net effect of recycling is obviously to drain the capital resources of businesses and 
to redistribute it to the appropriative economy. 
The hot potato effect occurred as traders and vendors grew less willing to carry finished 
products for long periods of time (whether to resale or transport them) than raw 
materials. In effect, as products became more processed (and thus more targeted), the 
discount rate on any investment concerning them would rise to compensate for the 
unwanted attention they attracted. This complicates the oft cited observation that social 
discount rates rise during war for specific targeted demographics (see e.g., Leaning,   16
Arie, and Stites 2004): while that is true, rates seem to vary also by type of product. 
This logic informs the entire balancing act between supply, production, and distribution 
(as explained in Sections 2 and 3.3). The owner of LISWINCO, a manufacturer of 
contract grade wood and steel products, for example, described how distributors during 
and even after the war wanted less stock on hand (furniture, in that case), requiring 
more flexible, just in-time production: 
Now the stores can take only a certain amount, like 12 to 15 pieces only. 
Before, they used to keep 25 to 50 pieces always in stock. This time, [if] 
they want something … they will call for it. 
The same held true for the looters themselves. Property rights were so routinely violated 
that whether one had produced a product or simply stolen it, it was safer to get rid of it 
as soon as possible. As Philip Parker noted: 
It was astounding to see the mentality: rebels would take over a house, 
strip it bare, sell the doors, the window frames, even the wiring from the 
walls—everything—and then they would move into it! 
Hyperactive markets actually meant that there were many more traders and vendors 
needed to distribute the same (or a smaller) number of goods. An especially large 
market grew up at Red Light, a traffic intersection that during the war was under the 
protection of ECOMOG forces, and which linked the markets of the rural, rebel-held 
territories with that of urban, government controlled Monrovia. As a manager at MB 
described: 
It [Red Light] was kind of a small marketplace, but now it’s bigger than 
Waterside [Market in downtown Monrovia], bigger than everywhere 
else, because that was the point of contact between the business people 
on this side and the business people on that side… So they [petty traders] 
would come, and some people would take the drinks from the factory 
there, carry there to sell and buy, some would go as far as to the [MB] 
factory and buy. 
Large, active markets kept final goods constantly on the move and safer from predation. 
Predictably, though, large numbers of transactions heightened transactions costs. These 
costs tended to be lower than costs inflicted by predation when supply or distribution 
routes crossed the combat frontier, and thus spatial dispersal increased as the frontier 
approached. 
3.3  The Balancing Act 
3.3.1 Production as Nerve Center 
The tripartite balance between supply, production, and distribution was a challenge for 
firms operating in peacetime as well as in war. However, wartime production demanded 
more rapid and finetuned responses to balance the equation because the situation could 
change so rapidly, and because there was an imperative not to be caught with processed 
or finished goods on hand. As explained above, half processed or fully processed goods 
attract unwanted attention from soldiers or civilian looters, and will likely be summarily 
expropriated if found. Raw materials, on the other hand, are rarely considered valuable 
on the market. Thus, while excess raw materials can be stockpiled, production and 
distribution have to remain constantly in lock step with one another. Because   17
distribution was most often outsourced, production is the variable in the equation that 
lends itself most easily to control. Thus, the production process must be able to gear up 
and shut down quickly in response to opportunities to distribute. As a manager at 
NICOM explained, daily production during the war was estimated based on the number 
of petty traders waiting at the compound gates. 
3.3.2  The Role of Information 
Accurate information about new developments in the war was essential for coordination 
of all supply chain components. That information was obtained in one or both of two 
ways: technologically, and through employee networks. During the Second War, 
foreign-owned firms with capital reserves to draw on invested in expensive satellite 
internet hook-ups to monitor constantly updated security websites. Such was the case at 
USTC, whose finance manager explained, “there were websites you could go and get 
security briefings on Liberia. Yes, the UN provided that service. Even the US 
government had that service”. Smaller firms used the radio to get information, but 
managers reported that they did not fully trust radio broadcast information. 
More commonly, firms relied on word of mouth for predictions about the timing and 
location of upcoming attacks. As a USTC manager related: 
There were some managers that were members of some groups 
downtown where they get information from. Based on that … some days, 
they come and say, “Our trucks are not going to town”. They may not 
explain why, but we trust them for that. And it won’t be long before you 
hear [about] something going [on] downtown. 
Smaller, less well-endowed firms relied on this second information gathering method 
more intensively. A manager at NICOM described the daily process of gathering and 
disseminating information to petty traders: 
We called our fellow workers that live within the vicinity: “What news is 
downtown? Is there fighting?” At the time, we were not distributing, 
anyone who wanted to purchase had to come to us, so we were called in 
emergencies, “How is the situation this morning? Do you think it’s safe 
for us to come to Monrovia?” We’d say, “Okay, everything is calm”, and 
then, “We venture out and come”. Sometimes we come maybe one hour, 
two hours, and then [snaps] thing breaks up again, and then everybody 
has to go back to his or her hideout. 
The ability to rely on technology to gather and diffuse information enabled larger 
companies to downsize dramatically during the war. A manager at USTC related that 
“During the war, of course, we didn’t even have up to 50 people here [a reduction of 
about 60 percent vis-à-vis the pre-war workforce]. Basically, production, guys in the 
garage to drive us. Hardly any distribution”. Smaller firms, though, might not be able to 
downsize as much, as with NICOM, which cut staff by 40 percent. NICOM, however, 
was then sourcing locally from petty traders and had a relatively protected location in 
central Monrovia. Meanwhile, the Manager of RITCO, a firm of about the same size 
and product line on the intermittently rebel-held Bushrod Island, felt he could not fire 
any staff at all for risk of losing vital information sources. As he explained:   18
When the rebels are grouping themselves together, you know we are all 
brothers and sisters in the country, so while the young men across there 
is planning something, he at the same time is advising his sister or the 
brother here that: be careful, we are coming! So at the end of the day, 
that information is sent to us, and we guard ourselves. 
Locally sourcing companies had the added advantage of being able to ask the petty 
traders who supplied them about conditions in the areas they had just traversed. 
LISWINCO’s owner, for instance, always made a point to ask traders where they had 
been and what they had seen and heard. 
3.4  Supply Chain Morphologies 
The balancing act described above may suggest why certain negative effects of war on 
the private sector might accompany counter-intuitive positive ones. On the negative 
side, economies in conflict are often hollowed out of intermediary industries, and the 
private sector as a whole becomes much less efficient (Humphreys 2003). On the 
positive side, civil war may spur technical learning and knowledge accumulation among 
local production firms that do survive (McDougal 2008). These phenomena are jointly 
explained by spatial dispersal. 
In a non-conflict setting, a simple production network is characterized by the diagram in 
Figure 1. Raw materials suppliers supply to the nearest processor, which then ships to 
producers who need specific types of intermediary goods. For instance, in pre-war 
Liberia, timber fellers would ship trees to saw mills, which would make a variety of 
cuts, from the hig value (planks and boards) to the less valuable (joists, short bits for 
furniture, and eventually saw dust). These mills could then ship exactly what was 
needed by each industry (export lumber, particle board, furniture) and wastage was 
limited. As described in Section 3.2.4, the combat frontier cut LISWINCO, a furniture 
manufacturer, off from the mills (which subsequently went out of business), forcing the 
company to buy from petty loggers and process the wood themselves. Wood wastage 
was then partly mitigated by buying those logs that lent themselves to LISWINCO’s 
products directly from the traders, as shown in Figure 2. One of the downsides was an 
efficiency decrease due to the multiplication of trade routes to processing. On the upside 
for the firm, they became adept at operating large saws to process their own timber. 
On the distribution side, as described in Section 3.2.4, networks of traders came to have 
direct relationships with producers, rather than accessing them at rural distributions 
centers where the firms used to “break bulk” (as shown in Figure 3). In this sense, 
predation by rebel groups did not mimic transportation costs hikes, because the 
economies of scale in transportation were more than offset by diseconomies of scale 
associated with detection. For that reason, Li and Polenske’s (2004) “dispersal 
economies” applied to the trade routes, but not to dispersed production facilities in 
linked industries.   19
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Figure 3. A production network with a combat frontier cutting the supply and distribution chains 
 
4 Conclusions 
I have described in turn (i) why production firm survival is important to countries prone 
to conflict, (ii) why a production network analysis is an appropriate lens to view the 
phenomenon, (iii) how predation selects for dispersed forms of economic activity, (iv) 
how dispersal can help to reequilibrate the essential balance between supply chain 
components, (v) the importance of a constant supply of information to production firms 
coordinating dispersal, and finally (vi) how production morphologies adapt to the 
presence of combat frontiers. I contend that in Liberia, the survival of specific sectors of 
the economy was not simply determined by trade intensiveness or capital intensiveness 
of the sectors in question. Rather, it was a function of the degree to which firms were 
able to cope with, and take advantage of, the dispersal that was required of them by 
environments of high predation. Such a conclusion does not invalidate the binary view, 
but it does indeed complicate it. 
A nuanced view of both peace and war (and all the grey areas between) as a dance 
between production and appropriation will give policymakers a broader range of options 
when trying to assure the well-being of civilian populations caught up in conflict. 
Especially promising possibilities for reduction of conflict destructiveness would seem 
to include peacetime incentives for production firms in at risk economies to source their 
inputs locally, so that they might become accustomed to having redundant and dispersed 
supply lines. Thus, the economy might not be so easily held hostage by rebel control of 
a single port or key international routes. Promoting upstream and downstream 
production industries decentralized across the country might also lessen incentives for 
brutality. Once war has started, other options might include ways of helping even small 
businesses and petty traders to become informed about developments in the war 
(perhaps via radio broadcasts), as well as communicate better with one another via cell 
phones or walkie-talkies. The latter point is especially critical considering the lock step 
coordination between production and distribution that is required for sustainable 
production during conflict. A better understanding of the daily distribution potential 
would allow production managers to turn out as many goods as possible without 
generating a stock surplus that could endanger their operations. Such options do not, of 
course, substitute for strong and determined interventions by a concerned regional and 
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disposal, and open the doors to certain preventative and stop-gap measures that can be 
employed when more dramatic action is uncalled for or unfeasible. 
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